Kerry Underwood

Archive for July 2017

ACCEPTING PART 36 OFFER DURING TRIAL

with 2 comments


In Houghton v PB Donoghue (Haulage & Plant Hire Ltd) and others [2017] EWHC 1738 (Ch) (13 June 2017)

the High Court refused the Claimant permission to accept a Defendant’s offer two days after the trial began, in circumstances where the Part 36 offer had been made nearly six months earlier.

The judge recognised that allowing acceptance of the offer would settle the matter and save the court’s time but against that was the fact that the attempt to accept had been left very late and that the Defendant now wished to take its chances at trial, meaning that for all intents and purposes the settlement would be court imposed rather than voluntary.

The court said that where a claimant decided to take its chances at trial, and then changed its mind because the trial was going less well than predicted, then the court would often conclude that it was not right to allow acceptance.

The court considered two Technology and Construction Court authorities relating to earlier version of Part 36

Sampla and others v Rushmoor Borough Council and another [2008] EWHC 2616 (TCC); and

Nulty v Milton Keynes BC [2012] EWHC 730 (QB).

Comment

I have no problem with this decision, but the Defendant who wishes to take its chances at trial could withdraw the offer and thus remove any risk of the court allowing acceptance of the Part 36 offer, as there will be nothing to accept.

True it is that the Defendant would not automatically get the benefits of Part 36 if the Claimant failed to beat its offer.

This throws up one of the many problems with Part 36.

Supposing in this case the claimant says   “Okay – we are part way through the trial – we wish to accept the offer of £100,000.00.”

The judge refuses. He will not know the value of the offer. He then goes on to award more than £100,000.00. Arguably, there is no problem as the Defendant will then have to pay all of the costs of trial.

But supposing the judge awards £98,000.00 and there had been a further £75,000.00 of costs occasioned by the judge’s refusal to allow the Claimant to accept the Defendant’s Part 36 offer of £100,000.00, which has never been withdrawn.

Why should the claimant be forced to pay all of those costs?

Why is it not reasonable of a claimant, realising the way the matter is going, to seek to end further costs by accepting the offer?

How is this different, in principle, from the court’s general refusal to punish discontinuing QOCS Claimants on the basis that it is better to discontinue than to go to trial and lose?

The policy of the judiciary needs to be thought through in relation to these matters, which I accept involve conflicting public policy principles.

As in most things in life and law, certainty either way has a great deal to be said for it.

Written by kerryunderwood

July 21, 2017 at 11:14 am

Posted in Uncategorized

ALTERATION OF BUDGET AFTER CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE  

leave a comment »


 

By Robert Males, Managing Partner, Underwoods Solicitors

In Asghar v Bhatti (2017) EWHC 1702 (QB)

the court considered an issue relating to the variation of a Costs Budget where it had been previously confined to court fees only. The issue related to the change of circumstances and in particular an early Part 36 offer.

Earlier in the case the Claimant had failed to file a Costs Budget and therefore in accordance with the rules the budget had been confined to the court fees only. The Claimant made an application for relief from sanctions but that was refused.

The matter was originally listed for a six day trial but it became apparent that that was not enough and so the trial was adjourned. The parties were given an opportunity to make an application to revise their Costs Budget on the basis of the change in circumstances in that the trial would now last longer than originally anticipated. The application to amend the Costs Budgets came before the Master. As mentioned the Claimant’s Costs Budget was already limited to court fees only so the question for the Master was whether it was possible to revise a Costs Budget in relation to additional work which had not been anticipated at the time of filing the original Costs Budget.

There is a relevant paragraph in the White Book which says as follows:

“If a Costs Management Order is made, it is arguable that a party treated as having a budget limited to court fees may, indeed must, seek revisions of it so as to include any additional expenditure made reasonable by developments which could not have been anticipated at the time of their breach of rule 3.14. Practice Direction 3E, paragraph 2.6 requires parties to revise their budgets in respect of future costs if significant developments in the litigation warrant such revisions. If a Costs Management Order is not made, Practice Direction 44, paragraph 3.7 applies. Under this provision the court may accept that the occurrence of significant developments in the litigation amounts to a satisfactory explanation for a claim for extra costs in respect of those developments.”

The Master decided to allow the Claimant’s budget to be revised because of the additional time of the trial.

The trial commenced but settled on the second day when the Defendant was given permission to accept the Claimant’s offer and as a result the Defendant was to pay the Claimant’s costs. The Defendant appealed the order which had revised the Claimant’s Costs Budget.

The court considered the two grounds of appeal. The first is that the practical effect of the Master’s order was to overturn the costs sanction previously imposed by the court which limited the Costs Budget to court fees only. The judge was clear that the Master fully appreciated the position in relation to the earlier Costs Order and that an application for relief from sanctions had been refused.

However the application before the Master to revise the Costs Budget was different. There had been significant developments since the failure to file the original Costs Budget. The notes in the White Book envisage a situation where revised budgets can be dealt with where additional costs which were not foreseen and were not anticipated the time of the original failure to file the Costs Budget. The judge held that if there was a significant development and if the Costs Budget was revised to permit those additional costs that will not undermine the policy underlying CPR rule 14.

The judge was referred to the decision of Mr Justice Coulson in Murray and Another v Neil Dowlman Architecture Limited (2013) EWHC 872

which dealt with a position if the Costs Budget could later be revised because of mistakes or inadequacies in the budget and expressed the view that that would undermine the whole purpose of the Costs Budget regime. However this case is different because we are dealing a revision to the budget arising out of a significant development which is the additional time needed for the trial and that information has arisen well after the original failure to file the budget.

Counsel for the Defendant submitted that the Master did not take into account the fact that revising the budget would subvert the original sanction ordered by the previous Master in relation to the failure to file the Costs Budget. It was clear that the Master had in her mind the events which amounted to the significant development and was well aware that she was allowing a revision to the budgets because of that development. Indeed she drew attention herself to the notes in the White Book as mentioned above.

The judge indicated it was a matter for the Master’s discretion as to whether she should allow a revision of the budget based upon the fact that the original trial was listed for six days and was now listed for 12. She was aware of the circumstances and decided it was appropriate to revise the Costs Budget since the original failure to file the budgets.

The Part 36 offer

The Claimant had made an early Part 36 offer in this case which was accepted by the Defendant on the second day of the trial. This brings into focus the provisions of CPR 36.23 and may allow the Claimant to recover part of its costs. This deals with cases where the Costs Budget is confined to the court fees alone.

“(1) this rule applies in any case where the offeror is treated as having filed a Costs Budget limited to applicable court fees, or is otherwise is limited to their recovery of costs to such fees.”

“(2) costs in rules 36.13 (5) (b), 36.17 (3) (a) and 36.17 (4) (b) shall mean – (a) in respect of those costs subject to any such limitation, 50% of the costs assessed without reference to the limitation; together with (b) any other recoverable costs.”

In order to follow this, you need to cross reference the various rules.

(1) 36.13 (5) (b) is a reference to where the parties cannot agree liability for costs and where the court, unless it is unjust to do so, orders “the offeree do pay the offeror’s costs for the period from the date of expiry of the relevant period to the date of acceptance”.

(2) 36.17 (3) (a) is a reference to the costs being ordered to be paid by a Claimant to a Defendant where a Claimant fails to beat a Defendant’s offer.

(3) 36.17 (4) (b) is a reference to the costs order to be paid by the Defendant to a Claimant when the Defendant fails to beat the Claimant’s offer.

What this means in practice is that a party which has their Costs Budget limited to court fees only can still recover 50% of their fees for the period after a Part 36 offer is made if the offer is not beaten.

This means that a well-judged Part 36 offer can still be of assistance to a party even though they have had their Costs Budget limited to court fees only and so the opponent still needs to be sure that they can beat that offer and it still gives the parties an incentive to settle.

A paying party could in fact be at some disadvantage even at half the costs because this would be a situation where they are not aware of the likely costs of the party because a Costs Budget has not been filed.

Written by kerryunderwood

July 20, 2017 at 9:08 am

Posted in Uncategorized

MIB, SET-OFF AND QOCS

leave a comment »


These issues are dealt with in my book Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting, Section 57 Set-off available from Amazon here.

In Howe v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [2017] EWCA Civ 932, 6 July 2017

the Court of Appeal held that a Claimant who had lost his claim against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, following an accident in France, enjoyed the protection of Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting and thus did not have to pay the costs of the MIB.

The Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the High Court which had held that the Claimant was not entitled to QOCS protection as the claim was not a claim for damages for personal injury, but rather for compensation under Regulation 13 of the Motor Vehicle (Compulsory Insurance) (Information Centre and Compensation Body) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/37).

Here the Court of Appeal held that the reference in CPR 44.13 to  “damages for personal injuries” could be interpreted easily to include a claim for compensation under Regulation 13 by applying the principles set out in Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA (Case -106/89 [1990]) ECR 1-4135.

The Marleasing principle requires national legislation to be interpreted in accordance with European Union Law in so far as possible.

The purpose of QOCS is to ensure that those who have, or may have, valid claims for damages for personal injury are not deterred from pursuing them by fear of having to pay the Defendant’s costs, except in certain circumstances as set out in the QOCS rules.

The Court of Appeal also held, although by the stage it reached the hearing the parties had agreed the same, that QOCS applies to appeals in cases that are covered by QOCS at first instance.

Regulation 13 of the Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) (Information Centre and Compensation Body) Regulations 2003 reads:

Entitlement to compensation where a vehicle or insurer is not identified

(1) This regulation applies where— (a) an accident, caused by or arising out of the use of a vehicle which is normally based in an EEA state, occurs on the territory of— (i) an EEA state other than the United Kingdom, or (ii) a subscribing state, and an injured party resides in the United Kingdom, (b) that injured party has made a request for information under regulation 9(2), and (c) it has proved impossible— (i) to identify the vehicle the use of which is alleged to have been responsible for the accident, or (ii) within a period of two months after the date of the request, to identify an insurance undertaking which insures the use of the vehicle.

(2) Where this regulation applies— (a) the injured party may make a claim for compensation from the compensation body, and (b) the compensation body shall compensate the injured party in accordance with the provisions of article 1 of the second motor insurance Directive as if it were the body authorised under paragraph 4 of that article and the accident had occurred in Great Britain.”

Regulation 16 provides:

“Any sum due and owing pursuant to these Regulations shall be recoverable as a civil debt.”

In Moreno v MIB [2016] UKSC 52

the Supreme Court said:

“In construing the 2003 Regulations, the starting point is that they should, so far as possible, be interpreted in a sense which is not in any way inconsistent with the Directives: Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA (Case C-106/89) [1990] ECR I-4135.”

Here the Court of Appeal held that the rationale underlying QOCS is a domestic version of the principle of effectiveness, that is that those who have, or may have, valid personal injury claims should be able to bring them without fear of the Defendant’s costs, save as set out in the QOCS exceptions themselves.

By the Claimant’s Regulation 13 claim being covered by QOCS he would be in an equivalent position to an injured person who sues an insured driver.

Comment:

A correct and welcome decision and, out of pure vanity, I set out my comment on the original High Court decision which has been overturned:

““This decision must be wrong in principle. It is over technical and fails to give effect to the clear intention of Parliament in implementing the Jackson Report, that is, as the judge himself here recognized, to protect “those who had suffered injuries from the risk of facing adverse costs orders obtained by insured or self-insured parties or well-funded Defendants.”

QOCS was of course brought in as part of a deal whereby those insured or self-insured parties would no longer have to pay the claimant’s After-the-Event insurance premium.

The effect of this decision is that a claimant in the circumstances does not get QOCS protection and to protect him or herself would need to take out ATE insurance, which is no longer recoverable from the paying party and therefore has to be paid by the claimant.

That is entirely contrary to the whole point of the Jackson Report on this point and entirely contrary to the clear will and intention of Parliament.
This decision should be overturned on appeal.

I am grateful to Ben Williams QC for advising me concerning this decision and for background information and material.”

 

Also see:

KERRY ON QOCS: BOOK UPDATE AND LINKS: UNIFIED

QOCS, APPEALS, SET-OFF & KAFKA

QOCS, PART 36, TWO DEFENDANTS: SOME PROBLEMS

QOCS, DISCONTINUANCE AND STRIKE-OUT AND OTHER THINGS

CREDIT HIRE, QOCS AND NON-PARTY COSTS ORDERS

Written by kerryunderwood

July 18, 2017 at 7:49 am

Posted in Uncategorized

QOCS, DISCONTINUANCE AND STRIKE-OUT AND OTHER THINGS

with one comment


These issues are dealt with in my book Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting, Section 57 Set-off available from Amazon here.

In Shaw v Medtronic Corevalve LLC & Others [2017] EWHC 1397 (QB)

the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court refused to set aside a Notice of Discontinuance and refused to give permission to Defendants to enforce a Costs Order in a Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting case.

The discontinuance did not amount to an abuse of process and although there were elements of the claim outside the ambit of QOCS protection, they were either not pleaded, or were de minimis and would not have added to the costs of the action.

Previously the court had set aside permission to the Claimant to serve the First and Third Defendants out of the jurisdiction and the claim against the Fourth Defendant was struck out and the Claimant then discontinued against the Fifth Defendant.

Now, the Claimant sought permission to amend the Particulars of Claim against the Second Defendant, who was the one remaining Defendant.

The First, Third and Fifth Defendants applied for leave to enforce the Costs Orders made against the Claimant.

The judge refused permission to the Claimant to amend against the Second Defendant and then struck out the claim against that Defendant.

Thus the position in relation to claim was:

First Defendant:              Service set aside

Second Defendant:         Struck out

Third Defendant:            Service set aside

Fourth Defendant:          Struck out

Fifth Defendant:              Discontinued.

CPR 44.15 reads:

Exceptions to Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting where permission not required

44.15 Orders for costs made against the claimant may be enforced to the full extent of such orders without the permission of the court where the proceedings have been struck out on the grounds that –

(a) the claimant has disclosed no reasonable grounds for bringing the proceedings;

(b) the proceedings are an abuse of the court’s process; or

(c) the conduct of –

(i) the claimant; or

(ii) a person acting on the claimant’s behalf and with the claimant’s knowledge of such conduct,

is likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings.”

In relation to the First and Third Defendants, the claim had not been struck out, even though the judge held that the Claimant had disclosed no reasonable grounds for bringing the proceedings and had said that had the Claim Form been served within the jurisdiction, he would have struck the claims out as having no reasonable grounds.

However, as the claim was served outside the jurisdiction the appropriate remedy was to set aside service.

Neither had the claim been struck out against the Fifth Defendant – it had been discontinued.

Thus CPR 44.15(1)(a), relating to strike-out, could not apply in relation to any of these three Defendants.

Setting aside discontinuance   

The Fifth Defendant sought an order setting aside the Notice of Discontinuance, so as to allow the court to consider striking out the claim on the basis that the Claimant had no reasonable grounds for bringing the proceedings.

That would have the effect of bringing the matter back within the CPR 44.15(1)(a) exception to QOCS.

The judge refused, saying that:

“… the Claimant had a right to discontinue under CPR rule 38.2. It was a proper use of that power, and to be encouraged, for the Claimant to recognise … that her claim against the Fifth Defendant was not sustainable and to discontinue that claim (Paragraph 53).”

The court recognised that it had power under CPR 38.4 to set aside a Notice of Discontinuance and the authorities suggested that that should only be done if there had been an abuse of process in serving the Notice of Discontinuance.

The rule itself is silent as to when the power should be exercised.

The judge held that the facts here were not an abuse of process “or anything sufficient to justify setting aside the Notice of Discontinuance (Paragraph 58).”

The court left open the possibility that servicing Notice of Discontinuance to avoid the claim being struck out on the no reasonable grounds basis, and thus triggering disqualification from QOCS protection, could be an abuse of process justifying the setting aside of the Notice of Discontinuance, but that was not the position here.

A claim made for the benefit of the Claimant other than a claim to which this section applies

This exception is interpreted to mean a non-personal injury claim.

There is an inherent problem with this exception, which is to be found in CPR 44.16(2)(b), and where the court’s permission to enforce a Costs Order is required.

The problem is that CPR 44.13(1) provides:

“(1) This Section applies to proceedings which include a claim for damages –

(a) for personal injuries;

Thus the whole of the claim does not need to be for personal injuries and the protection is not limited to the personal injury element.

If it were otherwise, the wording would have been something like:

“… which includes claim for damages for personal injuries, but only to those parts of the claim that are for personal injury.”

Even the judge got confused, referring to CPR 44.12.1. That deals with set-off.

Nevertheless the judge’s rulings at paragraphs 60 and 61 are useful guidance as to how such hybrid claims may be treated.

“60. This sub-rule applies if the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim include a claim which falls outside the scope of CPR 44.12.1. There were only two candidates for such a claim. The first is the claim for misrepresentation and deceit. This is referred to in the Claim Form, but not pleaded in the Particulars of Claim, as I noted in paragraph 12.2(d) of the First Judgment. I therefore ignore it. The second is the free-standing claim in unjust enrichment, but, as I said in paragraphs 32 to 35 of the First Judgment, it was unclear whether the Particulars of Claim did include a free-standing claim in unjust enrichment. Moreover, the Claimant did not obtain permission to serve the Claim Form out of the jurisdiction insofar as it contained a free-standing claim in unjust enrichment. Consequently, there was no such claim against the First and Third Defendants and CPR 44.16.1(b) does not apply to them.

 

  1. Assuming that there is a pleaded free-standing claim in unjust enrichment against the Fifth Defendant, it overlaps entirely with the claim for restitutionary damages. The additional costs incurred in dealing with the free-standing claim are minimal and it would not be just to make an order under section 44.16.1(b) on that account. I would have reached the same conclusion in relation to the First and Third Defendants if I had found that CPR 44.16.1(b) applied to them.”

The judge also suggested that the Civil Procedure Rules Committee may care to reconsider the scope of CPR 44.15(1)(a).

Comment

A number of cases on QOCS are now being decided.

This is an exceptionally complicated subject and the Civil Procedure Rules plumb new depths of incomprehension.

Fortunately it is all explained in my book – Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting, Section 57 Set-off – available from Amazon here.

 

See also:

KERRY ON QOCS: BOOK UPDATE AND LINKS: UNIFIED

QOCS, APPEALS, SET-OFF & KAFKA

QOCS, PART 36, TWO DEFENDANTS: SOME PROBLEMS

Written by kerryunderwood

July 17, 2017 at 8:54 am

Posted in Uncategorized

CREDIT HIRE, QOCS AND NON-PARTY COSTS ORDERS

with 3 comments


See my book on Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting, Section 57 and Set-off available for £25.00 on Amazon here.

In Select Car Rentals (North West) Ltd v Esure Services Ltd [2017] EWHC 1434 (QB)

the High Court upheld the decision of the first instance judge to award costs against the Credit Hire Company in a lost personal injury claim, where the claimant was protected by Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting and where there was no finding of fundamental dishonesty or anything else which would displace the normal QOCS rule.

Here the personal injury claim brought by three claimants included a claim for £23,456.85 for money due under Car Hire Agreements in relation to a car with a pre-accident vale of £1,710.00.

In fact the First Claimant had purchased a replacement car nine weeks after the accident but allowed her boyfriend to continue using the cars provided under credit hire until the boyfriend himself was involved in an accident.

The claims were lost, but no finding of fundamental dishonesty was made and the claimants therefore had the protection of Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting.

The successful Defendant sought and obtained an order for costs against the Credit Hire Company, Select Car Rentals, who were not a party to the case.

Thus the order was made under Section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

Even if a Non-Party Costs Order, or Wasted Costs Order is made, the starting point in a personal injury claim is that order cannot be enforced against the claimant unless one of the exceptions to Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting apply.

The relevant exception here is that the proceedings included a claim which is made for the financial benefit of a person other than the Claimant, that is the Credit Hire Company.

The Practice Direction in relation to Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting specifically lists claims for credit hire examples of claims made for the financial benefit of a person other than the claimant.

In an important statement the High Court Judge said:

“The fact that any given credit hire organisation’s connection with a claim is no greater than is commonly the case does not, without more, provide it with an automatic immunity from a Non-Party Costs Order. There is no room for the argument that it is a prerequisite to the making of such an order that such involvement be exceptional.”

Thus the starting point now is that in any unsuccessful personal injury claim involving credit hire a Costs Order can be made against the Credit Hire Company and enforced.

In fact the judge here appears to have confused the jurisdiction under Section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting.

What CPR 44.16(2) in fact says is:

“Orders for costs made against the claimant may be enforced to the full extent of such orders with the permission of the court, and to the extent that it considers just, where –

(a) The proceedings include a claim which is made for the financial benefit of a person other than the claimant or a dependant within the meaning of Section 1(3) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (other than a claim in respect of the gratuitous provision of care, earnings paid by an employer or medical expenses)…”

Thus if the proceedings include a claim which is made for the financial benefit of a person other than the Claimant, then the position is that the court may allow the successful Defendant to enforce the full order for costs made against the Claimant.

It needs to be remembered that in a Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting case that the order against an unsuccessful Claimant is made in the usual way.

What is different is that unless certain exception apply that order cannot be enforced against the Claimant.

Because the claim is for the financial benefit of a person other than the Claimant, that alone should not and cannot justify a Non-Party Costs Order.

What it does is to allow the order made against the Claimant, but generally unenforceable, to in fact be enforced with the permission of the court and to the extent that the court considers it just.

CPR 44.16(3) does allow the court, subject to CPR 46.2, to make an order for costs against a person other than the Claimant, for whose financial benefit the whole or part of the claim is made.

The judge here did correctly state that CPR 44.16(3) is not an exception to the QOCS regime as QOCS only protects Claimants and not non-parties.

CPR 46.2 is the CPR dealing with Non-Party Costs Orders and reads:

“46.2 – (1) Where the court is considering whether to exercise its discretion under section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (costs are in the discretion of the court) to make a costs order in favour of or against a person who is not a party to the proceedings –

a) That person must be added as a party to the proceedings for the purposes of costs only; and

b) He must be given a reasonable opportunity to attend a hearing at which the court will consider the matter further.”

Thus CPR 44.16(3) allows a Non-Party Costs Order to be made in a QOCS case but subject to the CPR 46.2 procedure being followed.

As I have previously observed the logic of CPR 44.16(3) is that anyone whose expenses form part of the special damages claim in a personal injury action is exposed to a potential Costs Order.

That is reinforced by the fact that CPR 44.16(2)(a) specifically protects those for whom a claim is made in respect of the gratuitous provision of care or earnings paid by an employer or medical expenses, which obviously means that all other special damage recipients are not so protected.

The bombs in the minefield of Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting are beginning to go off.

PS

 I particularly enjoyed paragraph 27 of Mr Justice Turner’s decision:

“I note that the authors of “Costs Funding following the Civil Justice Reforms: Questions and Answers” 3rd Edition conclude:

“Whether the working of CPR 44.16(3) (and CPR 44 PD 12.5) is intended to and does in any way relax the established common law as to the circumstances in which a third party costs order is available is a moot point and will no doubt be argued in due course.”

Having thus raised the question, however, the authors, perhaps counter-intuitively given the name of their publication, declined thereafter to venture an answer.”

 

Also see:

KERRY ON QOCS: BOOK UPDATE AND LINKS: UNIFIED

QOCS, APPEALS, SET-OFF & KAFKA

QOCS, PART 36, TWO DEFENDANTS: SOME PROBLEMS

Written by kerryunderwood

July 14, 2017 at 8:21 am

Posted in Uncategorized

FIXED COSTS COURSE – EARLY BIRD DISCOUNT

leave a comment »


Lord Justice Jackson’s report on fixed costs will be published on Monday 31st July 2017.

It will almost certainly create a new Intermediate Track for all civil claims between £25,000 and £100,000 with a compulsory Fixed Recoverable Costs Scheme for such claims, and a completely new procedure.

The Mercantile, TCC and Chancery pilot of High Court cases between £100,000 and £250,000 is starting.

All fast track claims, that is those up to £25,000.00, are likely to be subject to fixed costs.

This course is aimed at all civil litigators.

It is a first detailed analysis of Lord Justice Jackson’s proposals and how lawyers can best make them work, and is a completely new course.

The fee is £250.00 plus VAT and that includes lunch and provision of electronic notes in advance for you to use and to print to take to the course if you wish.

The course will run from 10.00am to 4.30pm.

EARLY BIRD DISCOUNT – If you book and pay by Monday 31 July 2017 the fee will be £200 plus VAT

My new book Personal Injury Small Claims, Portals and Fixed Costs deals in detail with the existing fixed costs regime and runs to 1,300 pages and 3 volumes and costs £80 and can be ordered here. Book the course and the price is £50.

Please select the course you would like to attend:

Date Location Book
Monday 25 September Birmingham Book
Tuesday 26 September Leeds Book
Wednesday 27 September Newcastle * Book
Tuesday 3 October Liverpool ** Book
Wednesday 4 October Manchester *** Book
Thursday 5 October London Book
Tuesday 10 October Plymouth + Book
Wednesday 11 October Exeter # Book
Thursday 12 October Southampton Book
Monday 16 October Cardiff **** Book
+ Hosted by KBG Chambers
# Hosted by Walnut House Chambers
* Hosted by Trinity Chambers
** In conjunction with Liverpool Law Society and hosted by St Johns Buildings
*** Hosted by Deans Court Chambers
**** Hosted by 9 Park Place Chambers

Previous Delegate Feedback

“Most of the big decisions in my firm follow a Kerry Underwood course.”

“Utterly brilliant!”

“Invaluable insight on the new developments in civil litigation.”

“Extremely detailed and informative.”

“Practical real world applications. Extremely useful and informative as well as entertaining and well presented – as I have come to expect from all of your courses! Brilliantly detailed notes.”

“I learned more than on any other courses. This was an exceptional and unique course. Actual helpful tips on how to improve your business and increase profits.”

“You give us the courage to keep going.”

“Superb, inspirational course.”

“What an original presentation. Loved your energy, passion and dynamism. Most unconventional but refreshing and original.”

“Amazing course”

“Extremely informative, the best and most useful course from a business point of view I have ever attended.”

“Loved the course – so did my staff.”

“Truly amazing content and presentation”

“Great day with Kerry who spoke brilliantly. A wealth of knowledge and a great teacher. Many thanks!”

“Brilliant – thanks Kerry. Really informative day and brilliantly delivered”

“Inspiration – Lee Mack meets Lord Denning!! Best on the circuit.”

Written by kerryunderwood

July 13, 2017 at 11:49 am

Posted in Uncategorized

FIXED COSTS FOR HOLIDAY SICKNESS CLAIMS

leave a comment »


You can now book onto my Fixed Costs Autumn Tour and there is an early bird discount if booked and paid by 31 July 2017 – here.

On 9 July 2017 the government announced that it had asked the Civil Procedure Rules Committee to include foreign holiday sickness claims within the Fixed Recoverable Costs Scheme, to bring them in line with domestic claims.

Currently both the portals are restricted to personal injury cases where the accident or injury occurred in England and Wales.

Paragraph 4.3 of the Employers’ Liability and Public Liability portal does not apply to a claim:

“(7) For personal injury arising from an accident or alleged breach of duty occurring outside England and Wales.”

Only claims which have been, or should have been, in one of the portals can currently be the subject of Fixed Recoverable Costs.

Lord Justice Jackson’s report on fixed costs, due out later this month, is expected to recommend the widespread extension of fixed costs to most civil claims valued between £25,000.00 and £100,000.00.

Such claims would not have been in the portals, which currently have an upper limit of £25,000.00.

The fact that the government has taken this action now suggests that a change will be made sooner than the extensive changes expected to come in together on 1 October 2018.

It is possible that foreign holiday sickness claims will be subject to fixed costs as early as this October, that is 2017.

Written by kerryunderwood

July 13, 2017 at 10:52 am

Posted in Uncategorized

%d bloggers like this: